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Tereza Matějčková
Hegel’s Invisible Religion in a Modern State:  
A Spirit of Forgiveness
Abstract This study focuses on the interrelation of freedom, finitude, and 
reconciliation in Hegel’s understanding of religion. These three moments are 
found at central stages of Hegel’s treatment of the religious, from Hegel’s early 
fragments to his mature work. Finitude taking shape in the religious phenomena 
of a tragic fate, sin, or more generally, failing, is central to Hegel’s philosophical 
understanding of one-sidedness. As finite, man needs to reconcile with the other, 
and only as reconciled does he achieve freedom. Hegel credits Christianity with 
the discovery of the primary essences of spirituality: freedom and forgiveness. 
Freedom is intensified with the death of God: man realizes that there is no God-
given, only man-made, legislation. This deepening of freedom does not overcome 
man’s finitude but instead intensifies it along with a heightened sense for 
responsibility, and an increased potential for guilt. In this context, forgiveness is 
the highest spiritual capacity of modern man, whose fate is to bear the freedom 
of oneself and the other.
Keywords: Hegel, freedom, finitude, sin, fate, reconciliation, forgiveness, modern 
state, Christianity, religion, Luther
“I hear the genuine ring enjoys/
The magic power to make its wearer loved,/
Beloved of God and men.
That must decide!”
G. E. Lessing, Nathan The Wise (1991: 234)
Introduction
On this occasion of the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther’s “Ninety-Five 
Theses,” scholars are again reflecting upon the deep spiritual, cultural, po-
litical, and economic transformations provoked by Luther’s revolution. It 
is beyond doubt that this religious revolution profoundly altered both the 
public sphere and the way (not only) Western man relates to himself, to oth-
ers, to his world, and to God. In fact, one of Hegel’s central theses of both his 
philosophies of history and of religion is that Luther can be credited with 
the “discovery” of modern interiority. It may be added that Luther was a de-
cisive factor in the constitution of the public sphere as well: the monk’s in-
genious use of the printing press turned the revolution into the first media 
event translating theological disputes into public debate. The inventor of 
interiority is in the most important sense an inventor of the public sphere 
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as well—and it is both of these “discoveries,” inner freedom and the public 
sphere, that Hegel sees as the doorway to (Western) modernity.
This success-story was not without its ambiguities, even tragic defeats. Lu-
ther damaged the Reformation massively by his involvement in the Peasant’s 
War, and Nazism—to name the gravest failure of a not-so-distant past—
formed in the cradle of a largely apolitical Protestantism too impassive in 
the face of dangers stemming from an aberrant ideology. Irrespective of con-
crete historical facts, it is generally accepted that Protestantism did shape 
(not only) the dominant “Western spirit” profoundly and lastingly.1
Even though this spiritual transformation is not easy to substantiate, central 
figures of Western intellectual tradition have emphasized the elective affinity 
of Protestantism, individualization, and rationalization. While Max Weber 
(1992) was interested in economic transformations that themselves gradual-
ly altered the face of religion and eventually Western society as such, Émile 
Durkheim wrote a “psychiatrically” oriented but no less classical counter-
part to Weber’s The Protestant Ethic. In his Suicide (1952), the French sociol-
ogist substantiates the thesis that in actively motivating free inquiry, and in 
releasing men from the burden of mediating authorities between his inner 
self and God, Protestantism gave rise to a pathological form of freedom—to 
isolation from human bonds and social structures, a phenomenon which led 
to a heightened proclivity to commit suicide among Protestants. For Weber 
and Durkheim, the protestant values gradually gaining dominance in West-
ern culture were more than a symbol of liberation; they carried a potential 
for social and individual pathologies as well.
Hegel is among the first thinkers to explicitly link Protestantism with a new 
form of freedom, calling this religiosity the flag of “freedom, of the true spir-
it” and crediting Luther with the discovery of an “infinite subjectivity” (He-
gel 2011: 506).2 This German monk did not leave the monastery in order to 
embrace worldliness but to transform the world itself into a monastery of a 
specific kind; henceforward, any deed and any occupation performed with 
the inner certainty of the presence of Holy Spirit is to be viewed as an act of 
devotion. Faith was not to be relegated to a specific time and place; instead, 
the whole life of the Christian is to be one of repentance, as expressed in the 
very first Thesis (Luther 1961: 490).
1 For a most recent publication dealing with the social, political, and cultural transfor-
mations triggered by Martin Luther see Ryrie 2017.
2 Hegel comments on Luther’s principle of subjectivity as follows: “This is the new and 
ultimate banner around which peoples gather, the flag of freedom, of the true spirit. This 
is the spirit of the modern era, and it designates the modem period. The ages prior to our 
age have faced but one labor, have had but one task, and that has been to incorporate this 
principle into actuality, thereby achieving for this principle the form of freedom, of 
universality” (2011: 506).
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Already Luther’s break with the monastery is an act of “secularization” in the 
sense of a transfer of people or property from the religious to the worldly 
sphere.3 This secularization is, however, religiously motivated; Luther does 
not denigrate the sphere of the holy but on the contrary aims to strengthen 
it by investing common daily occupations with spiritual meaning. Neither 
does Hegel, conceived of as the “father of secularization theories” (Dierken 
2014: 36), eliminate the sphere of the religious, even though he is critical of 
any form of otherworldliness. In turning away from otherworldliness, He-
gel—at least in his self-understanding—embraces religion even more firm-
ly: he takes it to be the very foundation of modernity. This surprising thesis, 
paradoxically, stands in no contradiction to the commonly held identifica-
tion of modernity and secularity. In Hegel’s perspective, religion finds its 
fulfilment in being integrated into the worldly realm. The West is secular 
precisely because it once accepted Christianity as its religion. From this very 
integration of the religious into the worldly sphere, the modern state aris-
es that is no longer attached to a single concrete confession or religion but 
guarantees freedom of conscience. In this sense, secularization is the fulfil-
ment of religion—it becomes invisible because it is what modern man and 
modern state stand on.4
In what follows, I want to analyze Hegel’s conception of religion from the 
view of this secular and secularizing fulfilment. Primarily, I will focus on 
Christianity, since it is this religion that takes the secularization inherent in 
monotheism5 to a new level. In Christianity, the “word becomes flesh,” and 
with it the perspective on man and God radically changes: God relinquishes 
a considerable part of his will to man and his world, even allowing man to 
condemn and sentence his son to death. No longer is it God’s but man’s will 
that is central to the story of salvation.
This theological dimension of the Christian story is the very fundament of 
Hegel’s understanding of modernity and modern conceptions of freedom. 
3 The term “secularization” has not been used until the 16th century, primarily in the 
pejorative sense of a profanization of the once sacred. For a history of this concept, see 
Strätz 1984: 792–809.
4 In this sense, Hegel can be viewed as having anticipated Thomas Luckmann’s (1967) 
concept of the “invisible religion.”
5 For secularizing tendencies in monotheistic religions, see Gauchet 1997. Gauchet 
follows Weber’s definition of disenchantment as an exclusion of magic from the worldly 
sphere. In this sense, monotheism is highly disenchanting as it refuses to worship diverse 
sources of the miraculous. Instead, the believer subjects his entire life to the only true, 
but unworldly, God. As to these monotheistic and secularizing tendencies, Hegel remarks 
in The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate: “The whole world Abraham regarded as simply 
his opposite; if he did not take it to be a nullity, he looked on it as sustained by the God 
who was alien to it. Nothing in nature was supposed to have any part in God; everything 
was simply under God’s mastery” (Hegel 1996c: 187).
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The “hard saying” that God is dead means primarily that God has ceded to 
man the power to decide—salvation is the gift of freedom and the duty to 
decide for oneself. In the following study, I want to pay attention especially 
to the interpersonal and social aspect of religion, and, in this context, I will 
specifically focus on an aspect less often emphasized but central to Hegel’s 
conception of a religious attitude in the modern world: religion as embodied 
in Christianity is a spirit calling us to discover our freedom. This tremen-
dous power is vitally linked with the second discovery Hegel attributes to 
the Christian spirit: forgiveness. In fact, the spirit of Christianity is essen-
tially forgiveness, and therefore, it is the spirit of freedom.
Hegel’s Early Interest in Religion: The Spirit of Community
I.
Already in the very first sentence preserved from Hegel’s oeuvre, the young 
student of theology shows a lively interest in religion characteristic of his 
entire early thought:6 “Religion is one of the most decisive aspects of our 
life” (Hegel 1986a: 9). In these earliest fragments, religion is not understood 
primarily as an inner spiritual dimension but as the uniting spirit of a com-
munity, even a factor constitutive of the social sphere: where there is com-
munity, there is religion.
In a way, this is peculiar. After all, these early fragments clearly show that al-
ready the young Hegel is conscious of the fact that modern religion as expe-
rienced in Protestantism is more of an inner spirituality than a public force. 
Especially in his later works, Hegel takes the separation of state and religion 
for granted, and it seems that—along with this separation—he in fact should 
embrace an interiorization of religion as well. After all, the public de-po-
tentiation of religion is only the reverse side of its interiorization ( Jaeschke 
2009: 10). However, does Hegel in his later work refuse the public role of 
religion, a role he embraced as a student of theology?
I will argue that this is not the case. In fact, Hegel’s writing is characteristic 
of a continuity of the early and late work. In demanding religion to be a pub-
lic force, the student does not call for its re-politicization but for its re-so-
cialization that is key even to Hegel’s later work. While a re-politicization 
is anathema to Hegel, a re-socialization is vital even in his later work—not 
despite the fact that modern society has discovered man’s innermost self, his 
individuality and the tremendous force of his conscience but because of these 
processes of individualization. In his early works, Hegel clearly seeks a force 
6 It would be an error, however, to infer from the fact that only early texts dealing with 
religion have been preserved that the young Hegel was interested exclusively in religion 
or has written only about religion.
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re-constituting or re-infirming the communal, once it has been questioned 
or side-lined by individualization and rationalization.
Considering the infatuation with Greek religion common among young Ger-
man intellectuals in late 18th century, it is no wonder that for Hegel, the re-
ligion of ancient Greeks serves as a model. In fact, it is in view of the ancient 
Greeks that Hegel finds religion to be indissociably linked to community: 
man as related to and dependent on his fellow, is part of the sphere of the 
social that overlaps with the religious (Hegel 1986a: 41). Of course, in He-
gel’s time, religion was often conceived of as a factor endangering individ-
ual freedom and autonomy. However, Greeks are considered the inventors 
of personal freedom precisely because of their emphasis on the social realm; 
this social realm, however, is only the reverse side of the religious. Thus in 
this context, if the appreciation of the social realm is key to personal free-
dom and if the social realm overlaps with the religious, it is at the same time 
the religious that is central for this conception of freedom, at least for the 
Greeks as interpreted by Hegel.
How can this be, or even more importantly: how did Hegel conceive of this 
interrelation of the social, the religious, and freedom? For Hegel, man is de-
fined by his capacity for freedom, but man is man only among other men; he 
is free only in the plural. Plurality, communality, and freedom are intimately 
related; an isolated and solitary man is not free, but is he religious? Not in 
the eyes of Greeks, and neither in Hegel’s. Greek religious feelings find ex-
pression primarily in feasts—and for feasts (just as for freedom), there need 
to be at least two or three. Hegel formulates the link between the concept of 
religion, community or nation, and freedom straightforwardly: “Folk-reli-
gion… goes hand in hand with freedom” (Hegel 1986a: 41).
Already in Hegel’s early fragment, Volksreligion und Christentum, the student 
emphasizes the fact that religion is not primarily related to the theoretical 
faculty but is decisive for human affectivity and volition. Just as his prede-
cessors Kant and Fichte, Hegel derives religion from a “need of the practi-
cal reason” (Hegel 1986a: 17). However, in contrast to Kant, Hegel’s interest 
lies not with religion’s role to motivate morality. Rather, the inspiration of 
Greek religion leads him to conceive of religion as a force constituting the 
realm of the social in the first place.
This aspect carries systematic consequences for his entire future work: re-
ligion is not an outer perspective on the given world and it certainly is not 
an “as-if-fiction.” Instead, it is constitutive of social reality and based on this 
constitution it secondarily takes on an ethical or moral dimension; it expresses 
the substantial, even ontological dependence of man on nature, fellow man, 
or gods, and conceives of this dependence not as a burden to be shaken off 
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but reinterprets it positively. In this vein, the dependency expressed in reli-
gion is fundamentally conceived of as an openness—it is the ability to view 
oneself as part rather than a whole and to appreciate this fact not as a desid-
eratum.7 Only in conjunction with others, with nature, and with God does 
man reach wholeness.
In this sense, it is characteristic that the young Hegel holds a negative con-
ception of understanding (Verstand): taken in isolation, this faculty of differ-
entiation is an instrument of self-love and closure. On the contrary, reason 
(Vernunft) is the ability of synthesis; its social “representation” would be com-
munality, an appreciation of one’s dependence on familial and social bonds, 
on bonds with nature, one’s body, and even on emotions. It is especially in 
one’s relation to one’s kin and near ones, in relation to the duties one has 
to others, that man transcends his limited self-consciousness and partiality.
In this context, Hegel voices his harsh judgement on present-day Christi-
anity, even claiming that it has perverted the nature of religion; instead of 
educating the human being to remain true to his world, the Christian is a 
“citizen of the heavens” (1986a: 43). Thus, Christianity disturbs man’s rela-
tion to the worldly and social realm, and it leads to intolerance, even mis-
anthropy (1996c: 201). In this sense, present-day Christianity is for Hegel a 
prime example of an otherworldly religion that elevates a narrow spectrum 
of phenomena to an absolute and by this degrades other manifestations of 
life as well as other gods to a status of inferiority or even falsehood.
Along with considering Kant or Fichte’s religion “within the bounds of mere 
reason,” in his early writings Hegel further turns to Lessing, whom he credits 
with finding a way to divest monotheism of his exclusivist and potentially 
fanatic spirit of an either/or (Hegel 1996b: 72). The emphasis on the ratio-
nal aspect of religion, on the so called “natural religion,” is to be understood 
as an attempt to blur the conflicting and often bloody borders of different 
religions or confessions and to find a new common ground of which the 
different religions were conceived of as mere modifications. Dilthey called 
the attempt to formulate a “religion within the bounds of reason” aptly “an 
opportunity to take a breath in a world tormented by the pressure of con-
fessional wars” (Dilthey 1911: 95). Hegel consents to this move: reason tran-
scends divisions—not because of a passive indifference, but due to its insight 
7 This conception finds a direct echo in The Phenomenology of Spirit. Commenting on 
the nature of religion, Hegel notes: “But this substance is now manifest; it is the depth of 
Spirit that is certain of itself, which does not allow the principle of each individual moment 
to become isolated and to make itself a totality within itself; on the contrary, gathering 
and holding together all these moments within itself, it advances within this total wealth 
of its actual Spirit, and all its particular moments take and receive in common into them-
selves the like determinateness of the whole” (1977: 414). 
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into the nature of differences that constitute each other. In this sense, reason 
is fundamentally linked to an “opening of borders,” and thus, it is liberation. 
However, for Hegel this rationality inherent in religion is not linked to a 
Kantian noumenal sphere or to logical reasoning; instead reason is the bond 
uniting men: it is the ability to find oneself in the other, to transcend one’s 
limited perspective and thus live up to the dictum “the True is the Whole” 
(1977: 11). If this dictum be considered from the perspective of Hegel’s re-
ligious thought and his emphasis on sociality, Hegel is more a follower of 
Lessing than of Kant: the wearer of the “genuine ring” is not characterized 
by a specific knowledge or by rational and regulative ideas but by his ability 
to make oneself “beloved of God and men” (Lessing 1991: 234).
II.
Hegel looks closer at this fundamentally religious and spiritual liberation 
(that is of an interpersonal and social nature) in the early fragmentary trea-
tise, The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate. In a philosophically more system-
atic manner, he formulates a unity of life that is not stifling as in the case of 
unifications envisioned by monotheistic religions. The monotheistic faith 
is built on exclusion, on a rupture: “The first act which made Abraham the 
progenitor of a nation is a disseverance which snaps the bonds of commu-
nal life and love” (Hegel 1996c: 185).
In Hegel’s conception of Judaism, God is the master, man the slave, and this 
fundamental relation finds its continuation in the relation of the believer to 
his or her world: the chosen one is the master, the pagan a slave to be sub-
dued, and as God’s partner man has the duty to subject under his power out-
er nature as well as his body (Hegel 1996c: 183). This peculiar dualism spe-
cific for Judaism carries significant consequences for the political structure. 
While monotheism favors a monarchical constitution, polytheistic religions 
allow for a decentralized political structure, even an opening towards oth-
er nations. The Greeks “by their gentle arts and manners won over the less 
civilized aborigines and intermingled with them to form a happy and gre-
garious people” (Hegel 1996c: 185). On the basis of his study of the spirit of 
different religions and communities, Hegel formulates a philosophical con-
cept of life that gives an answer not only, even not primarily, to the nature 
of different religions but that answers the ontological question, “What is 
being?” According to the young Hegel, it is “life,” an immanent, restless dy-
namic overcoming distinctions. These distinctions, however, are not over-
come—as is the case in the “spirit of monotheism”—by subjection. Instead, 
Hegel likens life to the archetypical element of water, its ability to overcome 
any distinctions being based on its malleability.
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In likening life to water, Hegel follows the oldest conception of arché in West-
ern philosophical thought. However, for Hegel water is only a metaphor, 
and rather than evoking Pre-Socratic thought, Hegel’s idea stems from early 
modern sources. Different intellectuals such as Jacobi, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, 
and even Fichte take life to be an immanent principle of wholeness polem-
ically directed against a reifying scientific worldview and a profanation of 
the world in the modern era. This is the decidedly modern background of 
Hegel’s interpretation of Greek religion. In his reading, the ultimate goal of 
Greek religion is to find oneself united with life, and the only means to reach 
this wholeness is by worshipping all aspects of life, a failure to stand up to 
the manifold duties in life ending most often in a tragic fate.
In view of this interpretation, Judaism, being a religion that places man’s fo-
cal point into the transcendent and calling man to tear himself away from the 
one but multifaceted immanent dynamic of life, fails to live up to this spiritual 
challenge. On the contrary, Christianity’s central term, love, is a life-unify-
ing dynamic. As to this, Hegel contrasts it with the Jewish religion: “Abraham 
wanted not to love, wanted to be free by not loving” (Hegel 1996c: 185).8 Of 
course, love is neither a mere emotion nor a perspective. For Hegel, as the con-
junction of differences love is the law of life, and thus life and love are twins.
However, Hegel’s contrast of Christianity and Judaism is not convincing un-
less his robust pre-suppositions are taken into consideration. In fact, Abra-
ham’s life seems to have been dominated by his very love for God, going so 
far as to sacrifice his only son. Hegel retorts that Abraham’s faith is a form 
of devotion but not of love; more specifically, it is a devotion to an oth-
er-worldly ideal, a sentiment that makes him a foreigner to the real world 
(Hegel 1996c: 187). Love, on the other hand, Hegel associates strictly with 
worldly, secular phenomena.
Why is love to be related exclusively to worldly phenomena? For Hegel, the 
world is a realm where man does not belong to himself, and love is the con-
firmation of the fact that “nothing is unconditioned; nothing carries the root 
of its own being in itself” (Hegel 1996a: 304). The loving person feels clearly 
that he or she does not belong to himself or herself completely and that he is 
complete only as related to the beloved one. In this sense, the phenomenon 
8 This rejection of Judaism is in many ways inappropriate and has rightly been criticized 
(see e.g., Jaeschke 2010). At the same time, Hegel does capture an important trait of 
monotheism that is closely studied even among contemporary scholars of religion. Ac-
cording to Jan Assmann, Judaism in fact invented what is today called religious funda-
mentalism and with it religious violence because it introduced the question of truth into 
religious worship: either man worships the right and truthful God, or he is on the side 
of falsehood and thus guilty of idolatry. As the Old Testament amply illustrates, the rule 
“No God but One” has been enforced by a form of violence unknown among polytheis-
tic cults and religions (Assmann 2016: 31).
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of love, prominent in Hegel’s early work, expresses something substantial 
about the human being: by his very nature, man is dependent on others, of 
course not only or even primarily in his affections but above all in his spir-
ituality and freedom.
Still, how does this relate to Abraham’s faith in God and his alleged inability 
to love? Key to the understanding of Hegel’s argument is the fact that Hegel 
refers to Abraham’s God as to an “ideal.” Hegel’s unusual terminology betrays 
his interpretation of Judaism from the perspective of a “Kantian” structure of 
thought. It is typical of his early as well as his later work that Hegel conceives 
of the Kantian (but above all post-Kantian, i.e., romantic) subjectivity as a sol-
itary and thus “un-worldly” inner realm relating qua, its inner, to an uncon-
ditional. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the reader comes about a structurally 
analogous form of consciousness: it is the conscience that is free from any con-
tent and can therefore “possess the majesty of absolute autarky” (1977: 393). 
However, the problem thematized repeatedly in Hegel’s work is that one’s 
own peculiar subjectivity can easily be mistaken for an (alleged) uncondi-
tional: instead of subjecting oneself to an impersonal norm, to a duty or 
sacral law, man elevates his own peculiar subjectivity to godly heights. In 
this sense, Hegel thematizes a phenomenon later taken up by Durkheim: 
freedom in the form of liberation from the outer can lead to a pathological, 
even fanatical, isolation. Therefore, Hegel emphasizes that it is crucial that 
any faith be lived in relation to another human being; anything taken to be 
absolute needs to be communicated and laid open to others’ judgement. In 
other words, the fate of modern religion is a “linguistification of the sacred” 
(Habermas 1985: 77–111), and in this process, the role of philosophy is in-
dispensable. For Hegel, it was philosophy that managed “to liberate godly 
reality from its other-worldly imprisonment” (Siep 2015: 179) and made it 
part of the (worldly) realm of argumentation.
This insight is present even in Hegel’s theological reflection of the founder 
of Christianity. In Jesus, God has revealed himself completely, and in this, he 
concluded the need for further revelations; now, we know the nature of God 
(Hegel 2011: 145). Just as God has laid himself open to scrutiny and judge-
ment, so too it is the duty of anyone to reveal oneself. However, what has 
God revealed? Jesus is the incarnation of love and humility, and as love made 
flesh, He is God. Substantially, Jesus is relation; relation is the new absolute, 
and in Hegel’s early fragment, this absolute takes on the form of love and life. 
As already mentioned, for Hegel, religion is an interpretation of one’s de-
pendence; in religion, man learns to understand his finitude. In this con-
text, the question of punishment becomes central. While for the Jews pun-
ishment reinforces the fact that man is deficient in view of God’s law, Jesus 
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is the friend of sinners, and he does not call for punishment when nailed to 
the cross; instead, he invokes mercy and forgiveness. This is central to un-
derstanding the Christian message as interpreted by Hegel: faults, sins, and 
failures are not condemned but instead are stepping stones, even “rocks,” on 
which spirituality is built. In other words, they are to be accepted as an inte-
gral part of the very substance of reality and even of truth. 
This does not mean that sins and misdeeds are welcomed, but the amazing 
message of Christianity (and curiously of Hegel’s philosophy as well) is that 
any wound inflicted upon life can heal (Hegel 1996c: 230, Hegel 1977: 407), 
and that any fault can be corrected. Again, forgiveness is shown to be akin to 
freedom; that man can correct any fault means that he is never simply a victim 
of his own failings but thanks to his freedom can follow up on these in a posi-
tive manner. This insight discovered in a theological context will be pivotal for 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Here, truths are essentially faults corrected.
Hegel’s Phenomenology of a Religious Spirit?
I.
It is a paradox that the Phenomenology of Spirit has often been read as a grand 
narrative of reconciliation even though it is a series of conflicts not solved 
but abandoned. The conflict of master and slave does not lead to resolution, 
neither Antigone and Creon’s fight nor the struggle of the noble and base 
consciousness. In this sense, the dispute of the judging consciousness and 
the acting conscience is exceptional, and it is in these closing passages of 
the chapter on spirit that Hegel examines his central concept of reconcilia-
tion, taking up the motives of judgement, evil, and conscience encountered 
in his early fragments. 
Hegel stages a conflict between a Kantian “judging consciousness” and a fig-
ure called “the doer” (1977: 404). While it is not known what this “delinquent 
of conscience” is found guilty of, the judging consciousness calls it “evil”: 
it failed to act according to universal norms and now appeals to an inner 
conscience as to the criterion of rightness. However, for a Kantian, whoev-
er places himself above the universal, acting according to his own law and 
conscience, is in fact wrongdoing others (1977: 402). The doer objects to this 
condemnation: at least he has acted. Meanwhile, the judge is a hypocrite: he 
refrains from action in “dread of besmirching the splendour of inner being 
by action and existence” (1977: 400). Instead of acting, he moralizes.
Suddenly something pivotal happens. The good conscience exclaims: “I am 
so” (1977: 405) and with this repents for his act. In repenting, man aims at a 
transformation; the profession of one’s guilt is more a practical than a theo-
retical act. The repentant seeks to lay open new possibilities both for himself 
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and for others. This can be illustrated by the simple and everyday act of apol-
ogizing; we do not apologize to inform the other of a fact that happened but 
to motivate him to come forth, to cancel some of our guilt, maybe to even 
acknowledge that he too has found himself many times guilty. In short, an 
apology is a call for reciprocity: “this utterance is not a one-sided affair, which 
would establish his disparity with the other” (1977: 405). Neither does the 
good conscience want its repentance to be understood as a piece of informa-
tion. Instead, in the failings of the good conscience, the judge shall recognize 
that his position is limited, too. After all, just as the concept of conscience is 
not without its problems so is the abstention from acting.
In other words, both protagonists are to acknowledge that the universal is 
real only in the deed, but this does not prove the judge altogether wrong; the 
individual’s deed is deemed legitimate only in being universally acknowl-
edged. One needs to act in view of the universal, and one needs to correct the 
particular act that necessarily fails to be universal by a form of retrospective 
rationality. There may be situations in which it is necessary to break univer-
sal norms. Post factum, however, the agent needs to convince the others that 
his breach was well motivated. If he fails and if his act is not acknowledged, 
by Hegel’s standards, an act not acknowledged cannot be considered good.
However, the judge is not ready to make any concessions and “repels this 
community of nature” (1977: 405); it is the “hard heart that is for itself, and 
which rejects any continuity with the other.” The fluidity of communication, 
the life of the spirit is disrupted (1977: 406), and the possibilities the situation 
offers seem to have been exhausted. Yet at this moment something even more 
unforeseen than the confession of the evil-doer happens; after the heart of 
the judge has “hardened” and after even the good conscience has retreated 
into itself, suddenly both are prepared to reconcile. 
What has initiated this strange break? Hegel does not even attempt to demon-
strate how this reconciliation “logically” came about. There is no logical 
stringency to reconciliation; if a conflict can be reconciled, something con-
tingent that cannot be enforced by either of the parties, needs to happen. The 
acting conscience cannot force the judge into forgiving; neither can the judge 
force the good conscience to understand his viewpoint, and even one’s own 
willingness to forgive is not sufficient for forgiveness. We ourselves may want 
to forgive and still be unable to do so. Forgiveness is an act implying willing-
ness by the parties on both sides, while at the same time transcending them.
Significantly, the willingness and eventual ability to forgive is the closing act 
of the chapter devoted to the spirit.9 In this sense, forgiveness can be called 
9 Stekeler calls this phenomenon aptly the “logical secularization of the concept of 
mercy” (2014:721).
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the highest spiritual act. Hegel uses in this context the expression Versöhnung, 
meaning not only “reconciliation” (1977: 408) but hinting as well at a more 
spiritually, even religiously, charged “atonement.”10 In Versöhnung, we appre-
hend Sühne, the German expression for “penance.” That Hegel in fact wants 
this act to be understood religiously is emphasized in solemnly announcing 
that at last God has arrived on scene, and Hegel even paraphrases a biblical 
sentence: “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there 
am I in the midst of them” (Matthew 18:20).11 God dwells in a “reconciling 
Yea” (1977: 409) in which both expand into “duality” (Hegel 1977: 409).
II.
Does this religious dynamic transcend the sphere of the interpersonal? In 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel focuses on the social aspect of religion in 
his explicit treatise of Christianity. Here, the reader hits upon the “hard say-
ing” that “God himself is dead” (1977: 476). For Hegel, this thesis is, however, 
not primarily of utmost theological significance but has primarily social re-
percussions. The moment self-consciousness realizes that “God is dead,” it 
reaches the insight that any normativity is “man-made.” It is man, not God 
who is endowed with the “infinite power of decision” (1986b: 404). No lon-
ger is normativity conceived of as stemming from eternal, godly sources; it 
is essentially social. With this insight, self-consciousness refuses Antigone’s 
claim that there is a law “unwritten and infallible,” and therefore “everlast-
ing” (1977: 261). This insight into the timely nucleus of everything that is, 
is the birth of modernity.
The closing passages of the Phenomenology of Spirit illustrate this fact that in 
modernity, human invention now takes the role of divine normativity. Ab-
solute knowledge is insight into the fact that as a fundamental part of the 
social, self-consciousness is both on the side of the subject and the substance. 
10 Etymologically, “at-one-ment” is related to the process of becoming one (Skeat 2005: 
37). Just as on other stages of the Phenomenology of Spirit, this is what self-consciousness 
is aiming for. However, on its spiritual journey, it learns that, paradoxically, self-con-
sciousness can be one only in the other (1977: 406); identity is mediated by the difference. 
A unity exclusively with oneself, bare of differences is, to the contrary, a “non-spiritual 
unity of [mere] being” (1977: 407). 
That this spiritual journey is religiously connoted is something noticed by Paul Cobben 
(2012) as well: “From the retrospective view of the (concluding) last chapter of the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, it becomes clear that religion pervaded the entire development. for 
this reason, Conscience reflects on a society that has passed through the development of 
revealed religion” (189).
11 This biblical citation is found in The Spirit of Christianity, as well (1996c: 387). In the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel alters the citation to fit the subject matter: “it is God man-
ifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge” 
(1977: 409).
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Subjective categories are substantial as far as they are social. As social, they 
are not at will of the individual subject, but since they stem from a social sub-
jectivity, they are open to modifications, even by the individual subject. Liv-
ing reflexivity flows and solidifies into objective structures of institutions.
This insight into the overlapping of spontaneity and passivity, into the sub-
jectivity of the objective, is what Hegel calls absolute spirit. Key to this insight 
is an appropriate understanding of the central term of Hegel’s philosophy—
reconciliation. In reaching reconciliation, the subject realizes that his or her 
spontaneity and the acceptance of this commonly shared background are two 
sides of the same coin. Substantiality is no longer linked to an otherworldly 
God, to eternity, but is part of the timely communicative horizon of society. 
In this context, we can return to Hegel’s thesis that Christianity has put 
an end to revelations once God has revealed himself in the figure of Jesus. 
Henceforward, there is no secret to venture. The meaning of this “end” of 
revelation is, once again, decidedly social; in modernity, the dichotomy of a 
revealing other-worldly God and a passive receiver of revelation is no longer 
convincing. Instead, the world as communicated to other men in scientific, 
aesthetic, or religious vocabulary turns into an ongoing process of revelation.
The Outlines of the Philosophy of Right: Spirit’s Will to World
I.
Hegel seems to hold two opposing views on the relation of modern society 
and religion. On the one hand, he takes religion to be the very foundation of 
the state. On the other hand, he decidedly emphasizes that the modern state is 
defined by being secular; and in a secular state, religion loses its monopoly on 
deciding what is right and wrong, and it is no longer key to offering life-ori-
entation. In the modern state, the political is set up with the intention to se-
cure man’s freedom against religious demands no longer deemed legitimate.
The subsumption of the religious under political power is in accordance 
with Hegel’s emphasis that in modern times, subjective freedom is pivotal. 
In the Foreword to his Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, he adds that it was 
the Christian worldview that captured this new concept of freedom for the 
very first time.12 However, this concept is not exhausted in the subjective in-
ner freedom but needs to translate into a new social reality as well. Echoing 
St. Paul’s Letter to the Galatians (3:28)—“There is neither slave nor free man, 
there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus”—in § 
12 In the Preface to his Outlines, Hegel stresses the absence of this inner, subjective 
freedom in Plato’s work and relates the discovery of freedom to an “impending revolution,” 
i.e., the birth of Christianity. The modern world is its heir (2008:13).
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209, Hegel states: “A human being counts as a human being in virtue of his 
humanity, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, 
etc.” (2008: 198).13
It is consequential that for Hegel, the foundation of this “oneness” invoked by 
St. Paul lies not in the person of Jesus Christ but in the institutions making up 
the modern state. Only in the modern state is this Christian freedom taken to 
be a general property safeguarded by legal structures. It is well known that 
Hegel interprets history as the “progress of the consciousness of freedom” 
(2011: 88), a progress achieved by world-transforming individuals and their 
fights for freedom. In this sense, the modern state is itself a revolutionary, 
world-transforming structure in making the fight for freedom of individu-
als superfluous.14 One shall not need to be exceptional to be free: freedom is 
a right common to man as man, an institution safe-guarded by the state. In 
this regard, Hegel’s later work differs from his earlier writings; in the early 
fragments, the theology-student criticized the tendency of early Christian-
ity to surrender to deadening positive structures. In his later works, Hegel 
notes that Jesus’ work has been fulfilled not by Jesus himself, but by his fol-
lowers. In fact, it is only in the apostles that we find the whole and developed 
truth because even “the kingdom of God, needs organization” (1986b: 397).
Luther challenged this institution for its decay, and according to Hegel, right-
ly so. However, Luther’s Reformation needed and in fact found a new ob-
jective structure—the modern state. In this sense, it is crucial to account for 
both the Christian teaching and the specific historical development of the 
Western state, society, and culture. Religion in the form of the “Protestant 
principle” is the groundwork of the modern state—but in the form of a prin-
ciple, not in the form of a concrete institutionalized church.
This principle finds its embodiment in the whole structure of the modern 
state and its institution—and it is this manifold structure that is the telos of 
history, not a concrete church decreeing its truths. The modern state is the 
true home of the realm of the spirit because it is universal and thus encom-
passing but supervening any concrete institution. As embodying a wholeness 
rather than a particular standpoint, it safeguards the right to have concrete 
rights. Therefore, for Hegel, it is the modern state, rather than the church, 
that is universal, and therefore the state is the rightful inheritor of the spir-
it of Christianity.
13 “They count not as Greeks, Romans, Brahmans, or Jews, as high or low class; instead 
they have infinite worth as human beings and, in and for themselves, they are destined 
for freedom” (Cf. Hegel 2011: 457).
14 “The heroes who founded states, introduced marriage and agriculture, did not do 
this as their recognized right, and their conduct still has the appearance of being their 
particular will” (Cf. Addition to Hegel 2008: § 93).
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II.
This strengthening of the state in view of the religious sphere is clearly 
motivated by the fear of religious conflicts endangering the stability of the 
state and the freedom of its citizens. However, Hegel’s interest in fanaticism 
reflects more than this fear. In fact, fanaticism is of systematic interest be-
cause it is the utmost sign of a loss of spirituality and thus of a loss of con-
text and the victory of partiality. Fundamentalism is an especially rampant 
danger in modern societies since its members need to accept that there is 
no one standpoint that is the home of the absolute. In this sense, funda-
mentalism is an anti-thought linked to the inability to accept modern real-
ity; it is a negation of the present, the given, and in this sense, of the finite 
since any concrete institution is finite and lacks the ability to be universal. A 
hallmark of fanaticism is undue emphasis on a particular standpoint elevat-
ed above competing perspectives and the attempt to subdue these. Against 
these fantasies, Hegel places the often-misunderstood thesis formulated as 
a speculative sentence:
What is rational, is actual/and what is actual, is rational (2008: 14).
If interpreted in a conservative, even reactional, vein, as many of Hegel’s crit-
ics have done, the sentence says that under the assumption that the actual is 
rational, we are to be satisfied with the present state of society, and thus no 
changes are warranted. However, upon focusing on the first part, the sen-
tence lends itself, quite to the contrary, to a revolutionary interpretation: if 
the rational is actual, we are licensed to aim at an actualization of whatev-
er we consider rational. This revolutionary interpretation is suggested by a 
version of the sentence found in Hegel’s work: what is rational, will be ac-
tual (Henrich 1983:51).
The “trick” of this Doppelsatz is that both viewpoints need to be taken: “what 
is actual, is rational” means that we need to take what is empirically given 
here and now as our departure; as spiritual, we are subjected to the demand 
to overcome and at times bracket our subjectivity, and we are to seek the ra-
tional in what is present, irrespective of our self-centered contentions of how 
the world shall be. This standpoint is a normative demand of what Hegel calls 
formation (Bildung): man needs to remain perceptive to his own blind angles 
and respect that the present in a way exceeds any one individual viewpoint 
since it arises from an objective spirit, i.e., from the spirit of the collective. 
In this sense, man shall be “obedient” to the present.
The first part of this speculative sentence, however, hints towards man’s 
spirituality: man is spiritual precisely in taking his own standpoint on re-
ality, in not accepting everything as simply given. In looking at the present 
as something to be accepted, man thus at the very same time needs to take 
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a second glance and ask, “What of the present is indeed rational?” With this 
second glance, freedom and obedience are integrated.
In view of this first part’s emphasis on one’s freedom, the call to accept the 
present in the second part is neither reactionary nor a call for blind obedi-
ence; rather, it is a form of caveat: man needs to take the standards of his 
measurements of what is good and bad from the present. The day is mea-
sured by the possibilities inherent in the present day, not from the distant 
future or past, since both of these are “otherworldly.”
What does it mean that they are otherworldly? An undue emphasis on the 
future fails to respect the present, even denigrates it to a transfer point with-
out value on its own. The nihilism of this future-orientedness has proven 
fatal for totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Neither is it an idealized 
past that shall be the measure of the present day. Once again, man sets up 
an ideal excluded from a rationality that is real only as lived in communica-
tion and argumentation. To be rational means to be open to scrutiny, even 
refutation, but both nostalgia and visions of a better future are irrefutable 
and therefore irrational.
Hegel’s double imperative expressed in his speculative sentence can be 
summed up thus: Take the present to be rational! Look for what is rational 
in the present! In this reading, the double-sentence is formulated as a pre-
caution against religiously or politically motivated expectations of a new 
redemptive social order. 
In view of this, it is clearer why Hegel decidedly refuses to take the church 
to be an arbiter of spirituality (2008: § 270, 249). In a secular state, any one 
party loses its monopoly on truth and authority. In this sense, secularization 
is not synonymous with a weakening of religion exclusively. The modern 
state too has to leave space for individual self-determination on the three 
basic levels of the modern state—the family, public society, and participa-
tion in state institutions. The state is thus a unity in difference, an identity 
of identity and non-identity: “The state is actual, and its actuality consists 
in this, that the interest of the whole is realized in and through particular 
ends. Actuality is always the unity of universal and particular, the universal 
articulated in the particulars which appear to be self-subsistent, although 
they really are upheld and contained only in the whole” (2008: § 270, 253).
From Hegel’s perspective, freedom and Christianity are twins—they tend to-
ward reconciliation of the individual with that which grounds or transcends 
an individual. Both strive toward truth. Truth as felt and lived is love; truth 
as expressed and institutionally lived is rationality. True to his speculative 
double sentence, Hegel fights on two fronts: against an activist political the-
ology and against a sentimental religion of the solitary inner. These two fight 
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zones are systematically treated in Hegel’s philosophy and in his dictum that 
“what is rational, is actual.” This famous Doppelsatz is applicable to religion 
as well: one’s own individual religious feeling—this tremendous Christian 
discovery of the inner realm—needs to be shared to create lived love and 
truth in the present. The spirituality of self-consciousness is the will to the 
world, the sphere of the secular.
Conclusion
Throughout his work, Hegel emphasizes Jesus’ demand not to judge. Jesus 
never condemns anyone—and by this he transcends the distance between 
himself and others, between saint and sinner, even Jew and pagan, but above 
all between God and man. This motive is taken up in the central passages 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit where Hegel treats the conflict of a judge and 
a wrong-doer and eventually introduces his concept of reconciliation. It is 
significant that a secular setting changes into a religious one once both pro-
tagonists are prepared to reconcile.
Hegel’s spirit is religious, by way of being reconciliatory. However, it would 
be a mistake to assume that Hegel aims at a dissolution of differences. On 
the contrary, he repeatedly emphasizes that the spirit is an acceptance of 
difference since these are at the same time means to apprehend one’s own 
limitations: the judge and the conscience reconcile once they realize the 
one-sidedness of their attitudes. However, it is crucial that this difference 
be encountered as incarnated in a concrete figure. Once the two figures 
reconcile, their differences do not vanish: “they are these sheer opposites 
for one another.” They are identical in their duality; thus, they are reconciled 
(Hegel 1977: 409). 
For Hegel, freedom is essentially linked to one’s ability to forgive, and for-
giveness is an act that Hegel treats almost exclusively in a religious setting. 
In this sense, religion is the foundation of modern society defined by its wide 
scope of freedom accorded to individuals. The free act moves the previous-
ly unmoved, by this the unforeseen comes into the world, and along with it 
emerges guilt: “Innocence, therefore, is merely non-action, like a mere being 
of a stone, not even that of a child” (1977: 282). Freedom is movement, and 
thus is at the same time guilt and pain.
True to his education in theology, Hegel takes Christianity to be key to the 
discovery of both primary essences of spirituality: freedom and forgiveness. 
Freedom is the greatest of our gifts—we have obtained the power to determine 
ourselves independently of God and independently of any of our individual 
failings. However, forgiveness is the highest spiritual capacity in the context 
of a being whose fate is to bear freedom—both of oneself and of the other.
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Tereza Matejčkova
Hegelova nevidljiva religija u modernoj državi: duh praštanja
Apstrakt
Ova studija se fokusira na međusobne odnose slobode, konačnosti i pomirenja 
u Hegelovom shvatanju religije. Ova tri momenta se pronalaze u centralnim sta-
dijumima Hegelovog bavljenja religioznim, od Hegelovih ranih fragmenata do 
njegovog zrelog rada. Konačnost koja se oblikuje u religioznim fenomenima tra-
gične sudbine, greha, ili opštije, neuspeha je u centru Hegelovog filozofskog ra-
zumevanja jednostranosti. Kao konačan, čovek mora da se pomiri sa drugim, i 
samo kao pomiren dostiže slobodu. Hegel pripisuje Hrišćanstvu zasluge za ot-
kriće primarnih suština duhovnosti: slobode i praštanja. Sloboda se intenzivira 
sa smrću Boga: čovek shvata da ne postoji Bogom-dano, već samo ljudsko zako-
nodavstvo. Ovo produbljivanje slobode ne prevazilazi ljudsku konačnost, već je 
intenzivira, zajedno sa pojačanim osećajem odgovornosti i uvećanim potencija-
lom za krivicu. U ovom kontekstu, praštanje je najviša duhovna sposobnost mo-
dernog čoveka, čija je sudbina da podnese svoju i tuđu slobodu.
Ključne reči: Hegel, sloboda, konačnost, greh, sudbina, pomirenje, praštanje, 
moderna država, hrišćanstvo, religija, Luter
